Instructor: Professor Pinch
Seminar hours: Monday: 1310-1600
Office hours: Wednesday and Friday, 1400-1600,
or by appointment (x2399, wpinch@wesleyan.edu)
This seminar examines the transition to British colonial rule in India, with an eye toward the social history of soldiering, military conquest, and colonial control. It is not a seminar in military history. Though the outcome of battles, the decision-making processes implicit to military command, and the technological merits of weaponry are of obvious importance to any historical inquiry into war, of greater importance to the seminar will be the effects of warfare on society and culture, and the social and cultural dimensions of war-making, in an India that was increasingly tied to Europe.
The seminar is divided into four parts:
2) Soldiers [weeks 4-7], in which students explore questions of identity, religion, technologies, and techniques in the context of military service, beginning as early as 1450 and ending around 1850.
3) Criminals [weeks 8-9], the objective of which is to understand the systemics of colonial control at the ground level in the nineteenth century, focusing in particular on the transformation of rural society into peasant society.
4) Students [weeks 10-13], the topics and readings for which are To Be Announced, since they will depend on each student’s research project.
Students should meet individually with the professor to determine the topic for the research paper, and to discuss sources and how to go about getting them at Olin. The first of these meetings should occur no later than the end of September.
The following books, required for the first three weeks of the course, are available at Atticus:
Schedule of Topics and Readings:
Part 1: Theoretical and Topical Introduction
15 September: Warfare and Society
6 October: Horse: Fogleboch/Pinch
3 November: Sikhs: Free for all
10 November: Thags, Pindaris, and other scoundrels: Royko/Guha
24 November: No Class: breathing room for students to focus on research projects
1 December: Military Afghans
The Pindaris have been characterized throughout
recent history as constituting only loosely organized groups of horsemen
whose sole cohesive activity was the execution of the seasonal raiding
party or luhbur. It was this very practice that prompted the British to
lead a campaign of extermination against them in the Pindari Wars of 1817-1819.
And it has largely been the only point of association considered by historians
when studying the Pindaris. Clearly the raids were a very important and
distinguishing aspect of the Pindari peoples, but the question arises of
whether they did not perhaps have a more developed and unified identity.
In other words, if they could in fact be regarded as a legitimate social
group with certain military, religious, linguistic,ethnic and cultural
beliefs, traits and practices common to all or most of the members of the
Pindaris. Were there distinct habits and customs that developed among these
horsepeople that would suggest a process of social formation may have occured
within their ranks. Does the emergence of a socio-cultural identity among
Pindaris have a discernible history? Can we then turn that history of identity
to the question of caste, colonialism and military service in India and
its history?
On January 13th, 1842, Dr. William Brydon arrived
in the East India Company outpost of Jalalabad, declaring himself to be
the "Army of the Indus." The defeat, in fact the destruction of this
essentially British force was the most serious loss suffered by the British
in their two hundred years of rule in India.
The First Afghan War was an
extension of the "Great Game" being played by the Russians and the British
across Central Asia. Hopkirk’s work on the subject suggests that
the individual agents of both the British government and the East India
Company drew the Company into the First Afghan War. These agents,
men like Alexander Burnes, William Mcnaghten, and Eldred Pottinger, became
personally involved in the situations they were assigned to monitor.
This personal involvement led these emissaries to argue the cases of their
favorites to the British authorities of the day. Although some of
these agents were more successful at this than others, they all worked
to further British interests in the Central Asian "buffer zone."
With the Simla Doctrine, the
Company, Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shujah took Afghan politics into their
own hands. They decided that the contemporary ruler of Afghanistan,
Dost Muhammed, should be disposed in favor of Shah Shujah, essentially
a British puppet. How did they come to this conclusion, and how did
they justify the rule of Shah Shujah? The Afghans, by all accounts,
did not take to Shah Shujah. How did this discontent end with the
destruction of the British expeditionary force.
In his article on "The Political
theory of the Mutiny," William Buckler discusses the relationship of the
Company as vassal to the Mughul empire. He argues that the East India
Company promoted itself to Britain as "conqueror of India," but at the
same time treats the Mughul emperor as suzeirn. Thus the British
concept of kingship was put aside on the subcontinent in favor of the Indian
version.
In Afghanistan, Dost Muhammed
ruled as vassal of the Mughul emperor. When faced with a choice between
the British, similarly vassals of the Mughuls, and the Russians,
who were complete outsiders, he preferred the British. This choice
was cemented by his friendship with the British agent Alexander Burnes.
By choosing to replace Dost Muhammed with Shah Shujah, Mcnaghten operated
under his own, European, concept of authority.
This is the point were Mcnaghten
broke with Company tradition. His misunderstanding, or perhaps his
disregard for the Indian concept of legitimacy and kingship led to the
defeat of the Army of the Indus.
How did the Company’s manipulation
of the Mughul patronage system cause or contribute to the advent of the
First Afghan War?
Bibliography:
Bayly, C.A. Empire and Information.
Cambridge: University Press, 1996.
Boyd, Newell D. "British Disaster in the
First Afghan War," The Historian v. 53, n. 3 pp. 571.
Buckler, Francis William. Legitimacy and symbols
: the South Asian writings of F.W. Buckler /, edited by M.N. Pearson.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1985.
Gommans, Jos. The Rise of the Indo-Afghan
Empire. New York: Brill, 1994.
Hopkirk, Peter. The Great Game. New
York: Kodansha America, Inc, 1992.
Norris, J.A. The First Afghan War, 1838-1842.
Cambridge: University Press, 1967
Paksoy, H.B. "Nationality or Religion?"
Bulletin of the Association for the Advancement of Central Asian Research,
v. 8, n. 2 (Fall, 1995).
Pandey, Sita Ram. Sepoy to Subedar.
Ram Gupta, Hari. Panjab, Central Asis,
and the First Afghan War. Chandigarth: Panjab University
Press, 1987. [Biography of Mohand Lal]
Richards, J.F. Kingship and authority in
South Asia . Madison : University of Wisconsin, l981.
Severn, John. "Empire-Building and Empire-Builders:
Twelve Studies," International History Review v. 19, n. 3 pp. 673.
Waller, John H. Beyond the Kyber Pass:
the Road to British Disaster in the First Afghan War. New York:
Random House, 1990.
--Sources--
Kali the Mother- Sister Nivedita
Anandamath- Bankimchandra Chattopadhyaya
?????- Swami Vivekananda
Bande Matram- Aurobindo Ghose
Bhawani Mandir- Aurobindo Ghose
The Intimate Enemy- Ashis Nandy
The Nation and its Fragments- R. Chaterjee
The Bomb in Bengal Peter Heehs
Bengal Terrorists- David Laushey
Europe Reconsidered- T. Raychaudhuri
????- Tanika Sarkar
Possibilities:
"Krsncaritra" Bankimchandra Chattopadhyaya
The Lords of Human Kind- Kiernan
Vidyasagar: The Traditional Modernizer- Amalesh
Tripathi
I can explain the significance of each of these "possible" titles to you should you wonder why they're on the list. More will certainly be added as I continue to mine references.
other (as of yet uninvestigated) possibilities:
Peter Fay's INDIA'S FORGOTTEN ARMY
Jim Leiken's honors thesis, Psychobiography of
Subhas Chandra Bose
Video: Rebels Against the Raj
Sugatta Bose's Video for the Netaji Institute,
Calcutta, India